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Investigating the Potentially Contradictory 
Microfoundations of Financialization 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The existing academic literature on financialization points to multiple instances in 
which firms attempt to demonstrate the vitality of their stock market position in ways 
which ultimately prove to be self-harming.  I demonstrate, in the first instance as a 
matter of immanent logic, that these actions are linked to the interplay of 
contradictory tendencies in the microfoundations of financialization.  Under 
conditions of financialization, firms create additional sources of credit to capitalize 
their productive activities by driving their stock price into greater increases than the 
market average, thereby generating capital gains.  Yet, the more it becomes public 
knowledge that the financing tricks used to inflate the stock price provide no 
productive benefit to the firm, the more that it would seem to create incentives for 
fund managers to hold portfolios that replicate the stock market as a whole.  In this 
way, they will minimize their exposure to financial misrepresentation.  Such a stance 
undermines financialized business models, but it does in any case conform to fund 
managers’ basic theoretical training, which revolves around the logical demonstration 
that an individual stock cannot systematically out-perform the market average.  I 
review the available empirical studies of fund manager decision-making to show that 
they find against the existence of a simple performativity loop operating between 
finance theory and fund manager behaviour.  However, on many points the empirical 
evidence does confirm the theoretically-derived conclusion concerning the potentially 
contradictory microfoundations of financialization.  Fund managers often do act in a 
way which is consistent with finance theory’s core claim that an index-tracking 
strategy represents the only equilibrium portfolio, even if this is only rarely as a result 
of the direct performativity of the theory. 
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Introduction 
 
The academic literature on financialization has tended to develop as a series of 
separate specialist arguments running in parallel rather than as an integrated whole.1  
The result is a strong suggestion of quite distinct moments of socio-economic 
restructuring.  An important task of future studies of financialization is to examine not 
only whether such moments cohere in their own terms, but also whether they are free 
of critical tendencies when considered as a single underlying shift in the social 
relations of production.  The main conclusion to follow from this article is that 
individual parts of the political economy of financialization often work against one 
another.  In particular, I argue that financialization is built upon potentially 
contradictory microfoundations, whereby the learned intuitions of fund managers 
serve to frustrate the attempts of corporate managers to introduce business models 
capable of enhancing shareholder value. 
The modern state has an accumulation function due to the fact that the 
cohesion of society depends upon the health of the economy (e.g., Jessop 2007).  In a 
financialized economy, the accumulation function passes directly through corporate 
managers’ success in deriving additional shareholder value.  This in turn depends on 
fund managers pushing the value of the financialized firm’s stock price above that 
implied by changes in the market index.  However, the accumulation function must 
always be balanced by a legitimation function (e.g., Carnoy 1984).  Economic growth 
is not enough on its own to ensure social cohesion, as the distribution of growth 
dividends is also important.  In a financialized economy, the legitimation function 
depends on the success of fund managers in investing passive savers’ money for the 
future.  By seeking to insure passive savers against unpredictable reductions in their 
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wealth, fund managers have an incentive to adopt only market-conforming strategies.  
Yet, such strategies render ineffective all attempts by corporate managers to beat the 
market average by pursuing shareholder value business models.  This appears to place 
the accumulation function directly at odds with the legitimation function in the 
microfoundations of financialization. 
In order to reach such a conclusion, the analysis proceeds in three stages.  In 
section one, I outline the main features of my argument.  I begin with an abstract 
account of the contradictory dynamics, before moving on to illustrate a variety of 
empirically verifiable concrete forms that the contradiction imposes upon economic 
relations.  Sections two and three are then used to deepen the analytical basis of the 
argument by matching the theoretical discussion with the available empirical 
evidence.  I locate the primary tension impacting upon the firm in the need for 
corporate managers to persuade their counterparts in investment funds to 
systematically unlearn all the knowledge imparted through their theoretical training 
which tells them that no individual stock can consistently out-perform the market as a 
whole. 
In section two, I show that the logic of firms’ attempts to forcibly increase 
existing levels of shareholder value runs contrary to how fund managers are taught the 
basic tools of the money management trade.  The contradictory microfoundations of 
financialization arise from a basic incommensurability between the two: the insights 
of William Sharpe’s Capital Asset Pricing Model imply the generic futility of all 
attempts to demonstrate superior levels of shareholder value.  In trying to persuade 
fund managers that their theoretically-derived intuitions are misplaced, firms are 
increasingly pushed towards strategies of self-harm merely as a short-term palliative 
for their shareholder value business models.  Treating this as a purely theoretical 
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issue, it is reasonable to assume a pristine performativity loop operating between 
finance theory and the financial economy.  Such an assumption, however, depicts the 
stock trading system as a fundamentally asocial environment. 
Empirical studies reveal a far greater social richness penetrating the process of 
fund manager decision-making.  As a result, I use section three to subsequently re-set 
the discussion by paying extra attention to empirical studies which situate fund 
managers in social context.  The evidence highlights the significance which is 
attached to constructing personal networks in order to facilitate socially embedded 
behaviour.  Fund managers routinely make themselves available for the frequent one-
to-one meetings requested by corporate managers to discuss their firm’s prospects.  In 
Sharpe’s hypothetical world, this is a complete waste of time, because fund managers 
should be concerned merely with tracking the market index and not with individual 
firms’ prospective performance, yet the meetings nonetheless occur (e.g., Rao and 
Sivakumar 1999).  But to what effect? 
The interesting conclusion to arise from section three concerns the contents of 
the one-to-one meetings.  The fact that these meetings take place at all is a point 
against the theory, but the evidence showing what goes on within the meetings does 
not refute the theoretically-derived suggestion of the contradictory microfoundations 
of financialization.  Whilst actual practice is predictably found to be much less clear-
cut than Sharpe’s hypothetical world infers, on many points the available studies of 
fund manager decision-making in social context go a long way towards confirming 
the presence of the theoretical relationships.  The identification of a strong 
performativity loop from the Capital Asset Pricing Model to a functioning financial 
economy remains an exaggerated abstraction of a much more complex reality.  
Nonetheless, the pressures arising from the context in which they operate do influence 
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fund managers to act in a manner consistent with what their behaviour would be were 
it fully performed by finance theory.  At least to an extent, then, fund managers do 
seem to inhabit the type of world described by the theory, even if it is not the theory 
alone bringing the world into existence.  As a consequence, there remains mileage in 
continuing to explore what I here describe as the potentially contradictory 
microfoundations of financialization. 
 
 
The Tendencies and Counter-Tendencies of Financialization 
 
An important element of the theoretical literature on financialization focuses on 
governments’ attempts to institute a finance-led growth regime (e.g., Aglietta 2000; 
Boyer 2000).  The aim of such strategies is to harness public policy to incentives 
designed to incorporate new financing techniques for making credit increasingly 
available throughout the business economy.  If successful, this drives growth as the 
credit is recycled as enhanced consumption possibilities for both the household sector 
(manifested in higher demand for everyday goods) and the corporate sector 
(manifested in higher demand for capital goods).  This can be thought of as the 
macrofoundations of financialization. 
My concerns in this article are rather different.  They are with the 
microfoundations of financialization.  In general, the existing literature on this 
particular issue divides in two. 
 
(1) One part of the microfoundations literature focuses on firms’ attempts to improve 
their stock market standing by purchasing value-based management advice (e.g., 
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Micklethwait and Wooldridge 1996).  This relates to new techniques for controlling 
the company accounts in ways that appear to leave firms undervalued relative to their 
competitors in terms of their overall stock market capitalization.  If successful, by 
enforcing the impression of structural undervaluation, firms can engineer significant 
boosts to their trend stock price.  This in turn is likely to free up new sources of credit 
flowing from the capital market into business enterprises, hence enabling firms to 
expand their presence in product markets. 
 
(2) The other part of the microfoundations literature focuses on individuals’ attempts 
to secure additional future consumption by transposing current savings into a range of 
different financial investments with the potential for realizing capital gains (e.g., 
Martin 2002; Langley 2008).  If successful, the long-term increase in portfolio wealth 
can subsequently be cashed in so that individuals can provide for themselves forms of 
asset-based welfare.  The processes of financialization are thus increasingly 
embedded in the goal of privatizing responsibility for consumption in old age and 
necessarily tie individuals’ future economic security to the success of firms’ business 
models. 
 
In other words, the microfoundations of financialization are located at the intersection 
of the household and the corporate economies.  My argument in what follows is that 
an essential tension exists at this intersection: the satisfaction of firms’ needs within 
the corporate economy undermines individuals’ attempts to provide for themselves 
future economic security via asset-based welfare, whilst the satisfaction of 
individuals’ needs within the household economy undermines firms’ attempts to use 
the capital market in order to enhance their operating potentials.  It is in this context 
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that I set out to investigate – in the words of the article’s title – the potentially 
contradictory microfoundations of financialization. 
The tension I identify is rooted in broader trends of recent socio-economic 
restructuring, the most important of which is the embrace of the ideology of 
shareholder value.  Shareholder value strategies have been promoted at two distinct 
levels: (1) as a means for firms to rationalize the reallocation of their own resources 
so that their productive activities are oriented primarily towards raising their profile 
on the capital market rather than the goods market (e.g., Froud et al. 2000; Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan 2000); and (2) as a means for governments to harness the flow of 
funds around the capital market as an automatic pilot for social relations of production 
which facilitate the shift towards a system of asset-based welfare (e.g., Aglietta 2000; 
Boyer 2000).  So, whatever tension is manifested in the microfoundations of 
financialization has implications not only for the way in which passive savers’ money 
is invested on their behalf.  It goes right to the heart of the viability of contemporary 
national accumulation strategies which are based around the dynamics of the capital 
market, because these in turn are predicated on the ability to continually expand 
passive savers’ paper wealth. 
As a general rule, accumulation imperatives must always be balanced by 
legitimation imperatives if a state is to continue its function of successfully 
embedding the national economy (e.g., Habermas 1976; Poulantzas 1978; Offe 1985).  
Under the influence of shareholder value ideology, accumulation takes place within 
firms whose business models are increasingly incorporated into the day-to-day 
dynamics of the capital market.  The stock price thus becomes both the capital 
market’s commentary on the operation of the business model and an important 
internal ingredient of the business model’s chance of success.  As a consequence, 
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accumulation imperatives revolve around the relationship between the firm and the 
capital market.  The firm remains the essential unit of accumulation, but only in terms 
of its capacity to negotiate its way around the constraints of the capital market.  In 
addition, the relationship between the firm and the capital market is now an 
increasingly important factor in securing popular consent for profits to be taken out of 
society.  That relationship therefore also acts as the potential source of legitimation. 
This is because of the increasing political salience of passive savers: those 
sections of the population of advanced industrialized countries whose disposable 
income is higher than their current consumption needs and who consequently have 
money to set aside to finance future consumption.  The short-run temporal horizon of 
accumulation strategies under financialization is juxtaposed with the long-run 
temporal horizons of legitimation strategies.  Firms require constant increases in their 
particular short-run stock prices relative to the market average to keep their business 
models functioning smoothly, whereas passive savers have a rather different interest.  
They need to feel secure in expectations that the overall value of the stock market will 
rise from its current level if they are to believe that their invested money will remain 
safe. 
In general, this money is not invested actively by the individuals concerned, 
but is entrusted to fund managers who invest it on their behalf.  Consent for 
shareholder value strategies is only likely to be forthcoming when those investments 
pay off.  As a proportion of them will be equities based, the ability of firms to 
continue to post stock price increases therefore provides the material underpinning for 
the legitimation structure in which shareholder value strategies are situated.  Much, 
then, rests on the relationship between company managers and fund managers – and 
much more than has been explored in the financialization literature thus far.  In the 
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presence of the potentially contradictory microfoundations of financialization 
identified here, shareholder value strategies will always struggle to balance the 
competing imperatives of accumulation and legitimation. 
The tension arises in the information flows that allow fund managers to decide 
how best to invest their clients’ savings.  Firms provide the detailed company 
accounts that constitute the major part of these information flows, and they have had 
increasing success in co-opting ostensibly independent corporate watchdogs to sign 
off aggressively presented accounts (e.g., Ravenscroft and Williams 2005).  The 
interests of firms operating financialized business models are thus satisfied by the use 
of innovative accounting techniques designed to provide instant ‘good news’ about 
the state of company finances.  However, the interests of financialized firms and the 
interests of financialized individuals are not aligned in this respect.  The more that 
profit announcements underpinned by aggressive accounting techniques are shown to 
be nothing other than artificial good news, the more that household savings are put at 
risk if they are invested in firms employing such techniques.  This in turn creates 
greater incentives for fund managers to diversify their investments on behalf of their 
clients. 
Fund managers will not have full information about which firms have 
company accounts that are a genuine representation of their long-term financial 
position and which firms have company accounts whose underlying message is 
primarily the result of manipulation via aggressive accounting techniques.  Set in such 
a context, their greatest chance of immunizing their clients’ investment portfolios 
from the full effects of corporate governance breakdowns is to avoid having large 
positions in any single firm.  This is best achieved by diversifying portfolio holdings, 
but the ensuing equalization of demand for stocks across different companies prevents 
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financialized firms from enjoying the credit windfalls that result from stock price 
boosterism. 
Only a limited number of shares of a company’s stock are available on the 
open market at any moment of time.  If a firm can feed the market environment with 
incredibly positive information about itself then fund managers might think about 
concentrating their clients’ holdings in a particular stock.  At this point the 
constrained supply of that stock would push up its price and allow the firm to profit 
from new cash flows on the back of its retained stock holdings.  Yet, all this depends 
on fund managers being presented with evidence of unusual circumstances, whereby 
one firm has either markedly better performance indicators or markedly better 
prospects than any other in its sector.  This in turn transposes into commercial 
incentives for firms to produce deliberately distorted information about themselves in 
an attempt to enforce the impression that their financial vitality does indeed represent 
something out of the ordinary (e.g., Coffee 2006: 31-2; Frankel 2006: 61-3). 
Such commercial interests manifest themselves in the temptation to create a 
wilfully duplicitous picture of the firm’s dynamic financial position.  In Lawrence 
Revsine’s sugar-coated phrase (1991), it is all about ‘selective financial 
misrepresentation’.  Yet, widespread public knowledge of such practices in the wake 
of Enronitis serves only to provide greater incentives for fund managers to stick 
rigidly to diversifying their portfolios as widely as possible.  Any attempts that firms 
make via creative accounting to persuade fund managers to renege on investment 
strategies requiring them to buy and hold the market as a whole ironically appear to 
make such strategies increasingly attractive to them. 
Equally, if firms do not engage in such practices then they also have no way of 
securing their desired outcomes so long as fund managers see no reason to depart 
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from the insights of their basic financial training.  Fund managers receive pretty much 
the same training as one another via MBA programmes, and the teaching on those 
programmes is dominated by exposure to orthodox financial economics (e.g., Thrift 
1998: 164).  The models on which orthodox financial economics is based are all, to 
some degree, variations of efficient market models (Watson 2007: 63-90).  In an 
efficient market, individual stock prices are unpredictable moving forwards in time, 
which means that those prices are likely to follow a random walk (e.g., Malkiel 1999).  
In the context of random walk dynamics, the only optimal stock portfolio is the 
market in its entirety.  Market-conforming performance simply reinforces fund 
managers’ instincts to diversify across the market, so firms must create the image of 
market-beating performance if their shareholder value strategies are to succeed, even 
if the knowledge of how they did so subsequently confirms to fund managers that they 
are always right to trust their instincts.  Hence, firms are faced with a genuine 
dilemma, and this informs my claim about the potentially contradictory 
microfoundations of financialization. 
Stated like this, the argument is very abstract.  However, there is also a more 
concrete way of cutting into the issues under discussion.  This is to begin with the 
question, ‘why do firms go bad?’.  In general, there are two types of answer that can 
be given to this question.  The first is to say that only some firms engage in systematic 
corporate governance abuses and that these are the firms that are unlucky enough to 
be run by bad people.  The second is to explore the possibility that all firms have the 
potential to follow a similar route whenever they are placed in contradictory 
environments.  The latter is my preferred type of explanation. 
Clearly, the evidence of firms going bad can be situated on a rather large 
sliding scale: raiding employees’ pension funds, deliberately deceiving outside 
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investors, manipulating earnings, authorizing false accounts, under-declaring tax 
liabilities, etc.  In general, though, all such examples are consistent with the 
increasing prevalence of what Julie Froud and her co-authors (2000: 109) have 
described as ‘value-skimming’.  These are coping strategies designed to protect the 
short-term financial bottom-line in the interests of presenting stock market analysts 
with ostensibly positive information.  Yet, they are founded on dubious economic and 
ethical practices which lack a credible rationale when viewed through the perspective 
of the long-term viability of the firm. 
It has long been argued in the management studies literature that an 
overemphasis on the financial bottom-line distorts the calculations of corporate 
officials and detracts from their primary goal of securing their firms’ economic future 
(e.g., Wolfe 1988).  Under shareholder value strategies, the protection of the financial 
bottom-line has become the core feature of the business model.  The focus of 
managers therefore becomes the current level of the stock price and little else.  This 
single goal, whereby short-term priorities are allowed to all but exclude long-term 
priorities, propels firms utilizing shareholder value strategies to adopt many of the 
characteristics that Burkard Sievers (1999) attributes to the ‘psychotic organization’.  
In other words, a pathological fixation ensues with at least maintaining the value of 
the company’s stock market capitalization, whatever the associated costs. 
Three types of activity are particularly worth mentioning in this respect, because 
each highlights the associated costs. 
 
(1) The incorporation of asset-light balance sheets.  In recent times, stock price 
increases have been strongly linked to increasingly debt-free company accounts, 
giving firms an inducement to divest themselves of large debt holdings (e.g., 
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Reinstein and McMillan 2004).  For firms which continue to own significant 
quantities of their own shares, this results in an important source of free cash flow.  
The culmination of such strategies is to be operating with what Michael Mauboussin 
and Bob Hiler (1999) have called a ‘gravity-free balance sheet’.  For, the debtless 
configuration of balance sheets of this nature provides a potentially endless source of 
free cash flows. 
However, debts are only usually taken onto the accounts in the first place in 
order to finance new investments which might protect existing product market share.  
Ridding the company accounts of debts is therefore often the same as selling off 
assets, but assets will only be built up initially if they have some productive potential.  
This situation is compounded if the assets being sold in the interests of short-term 
stock boosterism are essential plant and machinery which then have to be hired back 
at market rates.  In these situations, production costs rise, with subsequent adverse 
implications for firms’ ability to retain their long-term presence on product markets.  
Such firms will become increasingly unable to assist the long-term expansion of 
overall stock market valuation which is required to keep passive savers’ money safe 
and to provide legitimation for ongoing processes of financialization. 
 
(2) Share Buy-Backs.  The aim here is to target increases in the figure for firms’ 
earnings per share (e.g., Kennedy 2000: 59-60).  This does not necessarily require an 
increase in earnings themselves, because share repurchases retire a proportion of the 
outstanding common stock of the company in question.  As such, all firms have to do 
to increase both their earnings-per-share figure and their stock price is to ensure that 
their earnings do not fall by a greater percentage than that of the common stock it is 
able to buy back on the open market. 
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However, diverting the company’s resources towards share repurchases 
clearly diverts them away from its other spheres of operation.  As the bull run of the 
1990s reached its height as much of the available resources of publicly listed 
companies in the US and UK was being used on stock market activity to artificially 
boost the stock price as it was on basic research and development expenditure 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000).  The opportunity cost of share repurchases therefore 
seems to be restricted long-term product market potential.  Once again, the 
implication is that such firms eventually come to contribute little to the long-term 
legitimation of the processes of financialization.  Indeed, they might actually serve to 
undermine the sense of legitimacy if their difficulties in retaining product market 
share translate into the perception that the stock market ultimately destroys passive 
savers’ money. 
 
(3) Aggressive Accounting Techniques.  It is usual for firms who are engaged in 
attempts to inflate their shareholder value to use innovative mark-to-market and mark-
to-model accounting in order to put a positive spin on their earnings positions (e.g., 
Fusaro and Miller 2002: 13-18; Elliott and Schroth 2002: 40-1).  Under such a system, 
the value of assets is reassessed at the end of each quarter so that a ‘fair value’ price 
can be recorded for all assets which takes into consideration the fact that their resale 
price is likely to change over time (Revsine 2002: 141-2).  Often these assets will be 
complex derivative instruments designed to securitize firms’ future earnings streams. 
This means that accountants are constantly being put in a position in which 
they have to make a judgement call about how best to record future earnings from 
dynamic asset prices.  Yet, they often do so under pressure of being told that they will 
lose their business if they do not present the types of figure that the company is 
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looking for in its accounts (e.g., McLean and Elkind 2003: 39-42, 127-8).  This gives 
firms, in effect, a degree of discretion in the presentation of their own accounts: the 
reporting entity’s finance department has significant latitude to establish what counts 
as ‘reasonable’ estimate parameters (Benston and Hartgraves 2002: 115).  Nothing 
here is strictly illegal, but over-attention to lining up corporate activities with the best 
possible estimate parameters is once again usually detrimental to protecting long-term 
product market share.  As such, the capacity to incorporate passive savers into the 
financialized structure will be as impaired as in the previous examples. 
 
These self-harming strategies can be criticized in their own terms.  However, they 
arise for a reason, which means that it is necessary to say more about their origins.  
From the perspective of this article, they should be understood as counter-tendencies 
linked to the tendency for fund managers to be sceptical of firms’ attempts to induce 
market-beating increases in their stock price.  I turn in the following section to assess 
the origins of such scepticism.  I do so by examining the theoretically-derived 
professional habits of the fund managers who mediate the relationship between 
household savings and the potential success of shareholder value strategies. 
 
 
Portfolio Diversification and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 
Extremely few ordinary savers trust themselves to make their own investment 
decisions (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005).  Instead, the flow of capital into the stock 
market is mediated by fund managers acting simultaneously on behalf of many 
passive savers.  Fund managers typically shun the idea of channelling the savings that 
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are placed in their hands into a small number of investments: the reluctance to 
concentrate portfolio wealth results from the fear of being vulnerable to a sector-
specific shock to the market. 
The need to engage in portfolio diversification is fully specified within the 
field of financial economics.  The seminal contribution to this style of thinking is 
William Sharpe’s development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe 1963).  
Tracing the influence of the approach forward in time, we find that it underpins the 
assumptions from which the ‘normal science problems’ that still dominate finance 
theory have been constructed by subsequent generations of economists (MacKenzie 
2006: 51).  Moreover, for fund managers, the demonstration of professional 
credibility is tied to their willingness to act to some degree on Sharpe’s central, albeit 
contentious, suggestion.  His whole approach revolves around the core claim that 
rational portfolio management has nothing to do with in-depth knowledge of 
company-specific factors in the constitution of the portfolio. 
The assumption of rationality embedded in this view arises from the fact that 
the aggregate value of the portfolio at any given moment of time will almost 
exclusively reflect the level at which the stock market index is trading (e.g., Malkiel 
1999).  Around 90% of the variability of a portfolio’s overall value is unconnected 
with factors that relate solely to the individual stocks contained within the portfolio.  
Instead, it is explained by the impact on stock prices triggered by broader price 
movements in the stock market index.  Harry Markowitz (1959) had previously 
demonstrated that diversified stock portfolios contained less intrinsic depreciation risk 
than concentrating the same volume of savings in a single stock.  Sharpe extended 
Markowitz’s analysis to suggest that there was no end to the efficiency gains that 
could be made through diversification.  From the perspective of the Capital Asset 
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Pricing Model, the optimal portfolio is to be invested evenly across the stock market 
as a whole relative to each stock’s weighting in the market index (Sharpe 1970). 
No other outcome is possible given the mathematical models through which 
the fund managers will have learned their financial economics.  According to the 
principles of differential calculus, minimizing the depreciation risk of the portfolio as 
a whole occurs when the variance in individual stock price movements exactly cancel 
one another out (Markowitz 1952: 78-9).  In such circumstances, investors still 
experience depreciation risk on their individual stocks, but the short-run depreciation 
risk of their suitably diversified portfolio is zero (Tobin 1958: 71).  James Tobin 
referred to this as the ‘super-efficient portfolio’. 
Sharpe’s proposition was that, under these conditions, any attempt to adopt a 
super-efficient portfolio that was only selectively diversified necessarily led to 
behaviour which was out of equilibrium.  This was due to the overbearing, but 
individually random, influence that the stock market index has on the price of 
particular stocks (e.g., Bernstein 1992).  Selectively diversified portfolios cannot 
eliminate the random element of that influence and, therefore, choosing such a 
portfolio cannot be an optimizing strategy.  The goal must be to eradicate the 
disequilibrium aspects of choosing individual stocks from within the overall market of 
potential stock purchases in circumstances in which price trends of the market as a 
whole affect the price trends of individual stocks.  Using more complex mathematics 
than Markowitz, Sharpe was able to show that this desirable situation arises only 
when investors choose to buy and hold the entire market.  In other words, the random 
character of the influence of the market index on individual stock prices can only be 
eliminated when the investor is exposed to every stock which comprises that index in 
proportion to their individual capitalization.  According to the Capital Asset Pricing 
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Model, no portfolio other than the entire market results in investors being able to hold 
the super-efficient portfolio (e.g., Mehrling 2005: 56). 
It is fairly straightforward to hold a super-efficient portfolio nowadays.  
Advances in options pricing theory and associated developments in computer 
technology have made it possible to calculate the value at which to price synthetic 
assets traded against the level of the stock market as a whole (e.g., MacKenzie 2006: 
143-77).  Investment companies now routinely employ ‘quants’ – quantitative 
analysts trained not in economics but in physics or in mathematics – to handle the 
statistical computations required to pinpoint the precise characteristics at which to 
trade multiple stock index options in order to exactly balance the underlying portfolio 
of stocks in line with the insights of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (see Derman 
2004).  It is a well known finding of options pricing theory that there exists a unique 
combination of stock index options and cash which enables the investor to hold a 
synthetic position whose economic characteristics directly replicate those associated 
with the underlying index.  The investor attempting to apply the teachings of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model need not engage in a continual struggle to rebalance a 
portfolio containing every individual stock in the market following each change in 
relative prices.  All that is necessary is to rebalance the synthetic position between 
cash and stock market index options when the level of the latter changes. 
A whole range of new investment instruments has been introduced which go a 
long way towards ‘completing’ the stock market structure: i.e., closing the gaps 
between the markets for individual stocks by creating more precise economic links 
between them.  But they also have another very important effect.  Such is the volume 
of turnover today in index options that it has structurally reinforced the relationship 
that the introduction of index options was originally meant to reflect: the relationship 
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between the level of the index and the price of individual stocks.  If the latter had 
always been influenced by the former via the underlying ‘mood of the market’, that 
influence has now been irrevocably locked-in due to the ease with which fund 
managers can now load up their portfolios with index options.  The introduction of 
new stock derivatives thus activates a performativity loop through which the impact 
of the market index on individual stock prices becomes ever more accentuated.  In 
turn, the same performativity loop means that the insights of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model become ever more compelling for those whose learned intuitions are in any 
case instinctively to adopt them. 
In effect, the trade in index options has closed the gaps between the pricing 
structures of different stocks.  There is no intrinsic economic link via the productive 
economy between the stocks of any two given companies, because those stocks relate 
to independent corporate entities.  But there is now a financial link through the trade 
in index options which ensures that it is highly likely that the changes in stock market 
valuation between any two given companies on a particular day will be correlated.  
Indeed, the correlation in price changes between the stocks of any two companies will 
be replicated for all stock pairs across the entire market.  By creating this complex 
web of links between individual stock prices, the trade in index options has created 
what in other circumstances Donald MacKenzie (2006) has described as a ‘super-
portfolio’ out of the market as a whole.  That is, the stock prices of individual 
companies are now serially correlated with respect to one another.  Tobin’s super-
efficient portfolio and MacKenzie’s super-portfolio are now therefore one and the 
same thing: the outcome of recent periods of innovation in tradeable financial 
instruments ensures that both relate to the market as a whole. 
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The ready availability of index options means that investors can fully 
incorporate the insights of Sharpe’s analysis into their activities, thus guaranteeing 
that they do no worse than make market average returns whilst minimizing the overall 
depreciation risks associated with their use of clients’ money.  For fund managers 
whose performance is evaluated against their ability to meet the market average on a 
quarter-by-quarter basis, this appears to be the ideal trading strategy.  The Capital 
Asset Pricing Model is thus likely to loom extremely large in the calculations of fund 
managers, for whom failure to immunize their clients’ savings by holding 
inadequately diversified portfolios appears somewhat reckless.  Derivative markets 
now cover all possible types of synthetic assets in order to allow immunizing trades to 
take place (Steinherr 2000: 147-68).  Now that this knowledge is widespread, it acts 
as some sort of totem for the trading strategies of fund managers in search of a 
suitable benchmark to target. 
So, what can we take from Sharpe’s analysis for current purposes?  Perhaps 
most significantly, it appears from his perspective as though contemporary 
shareholder value strategies fail an important test of internal coherence.  If 
shareholder value strategies are to be successful, then management consultants must 
generate purchasers for their services by showing how the companies they advise 
have experienced recent stock price increases in excess of the increase in the market 
index (Froud et al. 2000: 90).  However, from the investor’s point of view, it makes 
no sense for the company to spend its hard-earned cash purchasing the consultants’ 
product.  If the Capital Asset Pricing Model is to be believed, it does not matter to the 
investor – or, by implication, to passive savers – whether a company has bought some 
high-priced advice about how to enhance shareholder value.  The stock of that 
company, taken on its own, should be no more attractive after the advice has been 
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imparted than it was before.  Despite the performance claims of the management 
consultants to the contrary, it is no more rational for fund managers to concentrate 
investments in firms that have invested in high-priced management advice than to 
concentrate them elsewhere.  According to the central model of financial economics, 
asset concentration is to be avoided in all its forms, no matter how or in what sort of 
companies they are concentrated.  If the stock market as a whole is the optimal 
portfolio before companies submit themselves to the advice of the shareholder value 
consultants, then it remains the optimal portfolio irrespective of the changes that any 
single firm introduces to its business model on the basis of management consultant 
advice. 
The following, then, is the finding from financial economics: shareholder 
value strategies cannot work in their own terms.  Fund managers who have been 
schooled in the insights of the Capital Asset Pricing Model can be expected to see 
through what will appear to their learned intuitions to be the illusory promises of the 
shareholder value consultants.  Instead, they will settle for continuing to invest in 
diversified portfolios which act against the consultants’ hopes that their clients’ stock 
will feature more prominently in the funds’ holdings.  It would appear as though the 
serial correlation of individual stock prices arising from the trade in stock derivatives 
leaves them with no viable alternative. 
 
 
Explaining Fund Manager Practice 
 
The tension I identify in the microfoundations of financialization depends on the 
existence of a strong performativity loop through which financial theory enacts the 
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trading strategies which drive the financial economy on a day-by-day basis (e.g., 
Callon 1998).  This is implied as a matter of logic, but it is a bold claim to make in 
relation to actual practice (e.g., Abolafia 1996; Shiller 2000; Sassen 2005).  It depicts 
fund managers as little more than bearers of the structural effects established by the 
dominant models of financial theory. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the empirical evidence on the dynamics of fund 
manager decision-making does precious little to sustain the image of completely 
socially abstracted behaviour.  It suggests that the valuation of shares is at least partly 
a social phenomenon, insofar as network participation creates the necessary ‘feel’ for 
the market which then conditions subsequent behaviour.  In Sharpe’s Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, anonymity in stock trading is no impediment to investors acting upon 
optimizing strategies.  In fact, it might even assist in the process of maintaining 
portfolio equilibrium, because it keeps potentially ‘unhelpful’ social influences at bay.  
To cope with the demands of Sharpe’s hypothetical world requires only that investors 
interact in a perfunctory manner with numerical data relating to movements in the 
market index.  Trading software is beginning to come on-stream which reduces the 
trading function simply to a process of shape recognition on computer screens, 
whereby what the trader sees in the shapes is a visual representation of changes in 
numerical market data (e.g., Pryke 2007).  It is most unlikely, though, that this will 
ever fully substitute for the interpersonal experiences through which investors divine 
clues about what to buy and what to sell. 
The reality of stock trading is hardly ever an anonymous process.  Positioning 
oneself relative to market pricing trends is almost always mediated by prior contact 
with other people.  To cope with the demands of the actual practice of stock trading 
therefore requires something quite different to what is implied by the Capital Asset 
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Pricing Model.  It involves assessing the always changing mood of the market, where 
in this case ‘the market’ is nothing more than the opinions of the fellow traders who 
comprise it.  By necessity, then, if they are to get any sense of likely price changes 
fund managers must situate themselves in a much socially richer context than 
Sharpe’s hypothetical world (e.g., Knorr Cetina 2005). 
Considerable effort is expended by both parties to the microfoundations of 
financialization – fund managers on the one hand and corporate managers on the other 
– in an attempt to finesse that context to their own advantage.  Post-tech stock crash 
and post-Enron, the legal environment in which US and UK fund managers operate 
has changed, reflecting a rather greater political commitment to ensuring oversight of 
the way that passive savers’ money is invested on their behalf (e.g., Thornburg and 
Roberts 2008).  They are subjected to more intense scrutiny of their diligence at 
safeguarding the value of that money.  For this reason, fund managers have willingly 
acquiesced to requests for meetings with corporate managers, because this is an 
important means of demonstrating due diligence (e.g., ISC 2002).  However, it is 
significant that in general they are not the instigators of those meetings.  This suggests 
that it is the corporate managers who believe that they have most to gain from 
initiating closer network relationships with fund managers. 
In a recent qualitative study of firms’ approach to the question of investor 
relations, Aeron Davis (2006: 8) has shown the lengths to which corporate managers 
are prepared to go in order to keep their firm – and its stock price – in the minds of 
fund managers.  “All quoted companies, and their advisors, were aware of who their 
major shareholders and assessors were, and maintained high levels of communication 
with them.”  In the US and the UK at least, the process of guiding investor relations 
has become big business in its own right.  Both countries now have a professional 
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association providing oversight of key investor relations’ functions, as well as 
collecting data on best practice to allow firms to match themselves against the most 
impressive performance indicators in the field (e.g., Marston 1996: 479). 
The most authoritative full-scale UK survey was performed by the Investor 
Relations Society in 1998.  It showed that more than three-quarters of UK chief 
executive officers organized on an annual basis at least a dozen one-to-one meetings 
with fund managers to present the case for their firms to be included in the funds’ 
portfolios.  One-in-ten chief executive officers reported spending up to one-third of 
their time solely on trying to fashion advantageous relations with investors (IRS 
1998). 
On the basis of these statistics alone, we can conclude that corporate 
managers’ perceptions of their everyday working environment are outwardly very 
different to those of the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  There is no assumption on their 
part that they exist in Sharpe’s hypothetical world.  If there was, it would be an 
indelible part of their intuitive understanding of their environment that they were 
entirely powerless to alter the way in which their companies’ prevailing stock price 
was received.  Within the world of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, all decisions to 
buy and sell stocks take place relative to movements in the overall market index, not 
relative to news about likely company performance.  All such news is rendered 
entirely inconsequential by Sharpe’s assumptions about portfolio equilibrium (e.g., 
Mehrling 2005).  Set against such assumptions, the verifiable presence of extensive 
strategies of active management of investor relations is a significant finding.  It 
appears very much to create an unbridgeable gap between Sharpe’s hypothetical 
world and actual practice: the active management of investor relations is all about 
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trying to discriminate one firm from another in precisely the manner that the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model suggests is futile. 
Discrimination techniques are by no means new or confined to the one-to-one 
meetings that corporate managers organize with fund managers.  The whole ethos of 
public disclosure in the accounts and auditing process is intended to provide a way for 
investors to spot potentially stock price-sensitive differences between the ongoing 
financial positions of one company and every other (e.g., Trinkhaus and Giacalone 
2005).  The numerical nature of the accounts and auditing process offers investors a 
relatively straightforward means of ranking companies one against another.  The 
significance of the one-to-one meetings is that they emphasize the interpersonal 
nature of investor relations in a manner which public disclosure data does not. 
The very fact that corporate managers feel obliged to put themselves 
personally ‘on show’ for fund managers demonstrates the importance they attribute to 
the social networks which are the back story to most stock trading decisions.  Whilst 
public disclosure of accounts and auditing data only allows for the vicarious 
observation of ‘distant others’, one-to-one meetings with corporate managers enable 
fund managers to engage in direct observations of a highly personalized nature (e.g., 
Roberts 2001).  Companies with historically high beta shares (i.e., a greater than 
average variance in their stock price) have been most assiduous in attempting to foster 
compliant social networks (Marston 1996: 485).  It is their managers, therefore, who 
submit themselves most routinely to direct observations. 
In contrast to the largely non-socialized behavioural characteristics associated 
with performativity loops, the presence of active investor relations tends to 
personalize – perhaps even over-personalize – fund managers’ perceptions of 
companies.  As John Roberts and his co-authors suggest (2006: 286, emphasis added): 
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“Face-to-face meetings ensure that the qualities of the message and the messengers 
become inextricably and consequentially entwined …  Individual executives, albeit 
the most senior managers, here stand in for – literally represent – the company”.  The 
empirical evidence suggests that potential investors take the most positive impressions 
from one-to-one meetings in which corporate managers make the case that the 
company remains ‘on track’ as a direct reflection of their own personal management 
psyche.  Fund managers look for a management style which exerts a tight grip on day-
to-day activities, clamping down on any evidence of excessive perks which might 
divert company personnel from concentrating solely on achieving the firm’s long-
term objectives.  The British Venture Capital Association has gone as far as to draw 
up a ‘signs of frivolity’ checklist in an attempt to highlight the personal traits in 
managers that investors should seek to avoid (Nisbet 1994: 147).  Corporate managers 
therefore engage in sometimes quite conspicuous processes of self-disciplining simply 
to prepare themselves to act and to look the right way. 
The emphasis on the personal dimension in empirical studies of the stock 
trading system appears to take the argument quite some distance from where it was 
situated in the opening two sections.  Yet, before I rush to judgement and condemn 
my own perspective, a little further analysis is still in order.  As is so often the case, 
the devil is in the detail here.  The available empirical evidence is certainly strongly 
suggestive of the fact that fund managers do not inhabit Sharpe’s purely hypothetical 
world.  However, the substantive dynamics of one-to-one meetings between corporate 
managers and fund managers do to some degree push in the general direction of a 
world constructed in the image of the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  Four issues can 
usefully be highlighted in this respect to show that there is still life in the 
identification of the potentially contradictory microfoundations of financialization.  I 
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close by reviewing these four cases in turn.  Significantly, each of them is drawn from 
the empirical literature which might otherwise be read as evidence against the 
perspective I develop in the opening two sections. 
 
(1) The empirical literature charting the influences on fund manager decision-making 
revolves, at its core, around the question of whether or not a systematic approach to 
one-to-one meetings with corporate managers helps to make the stock market more 
efficient (e.g., Holland 2002).  The rationale for asking such a question is itself drawn 
from modern finance theory, in particular its assumption that the relationship on any 
given day between an individual stock price and the market index is governed by the 
amount of information which is factored into investors’ calculations of the stock’s real 
worth (Bernstein 1992).  An efficiently priced market is therefore an informationally-
efficient market (e.g., Samuelson 1965: 41; Fama 1991: 1575). 
In general, the empirical literature concludes that active management of 
investor relations does indeed enhance market efficiency (e.g., Barker 1998; Holland 
and Doran 1998).  Yet, it is an efficient market which conditions the need to possess 
the equilibrium portfolio of fully diversified stock holdings in Sharpe’s hypothetical 
world.  Ironically, then, the more that one-to-one meetings between corporate 
managers and fund managers feed the stock market environment with information, the 
less operative that information is likely to become as a means of valuing individual 
stocks.  This is because the gains in market efficiency will make it progressively 
harder for any selectively diversified portfolio to out-perform a weighted average of 
the market index.  In such circumstances, the incentive is to act as if the real world 
was indeed Sharpe’s hypothetical world and to construct a fully diversified portfolio 
equivalent to holding the market as a whole. 
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(2) Moreover, the practicalities of the meetings themselves emphasize concerns for 
market efficiency as an implicit normative goal.  There is a clear power asymmetry in 
the organization of the meetings: corporate managers make appointments with fund 
managers and travel to see them, not the other way around; corporate managers are 
required to justify their actions to fund managers, not the other way around.  Whilst 
companies will send their most senior executives to act on behalf of the firm, they 
usually find that they are presenting themselves to a much younger and more junior 
representative of the fund who has no practical experience of running a business.  As 
empirical studies show, theoretical knowledge is typically substituted for practical 
knowledge in such circumstances, especially the theoretical knowledge which the 
juniors standing in for the fund managers have “gleaned through an MBA” (Roberts 
et al. 2006: 285).  Whereas companies usually strive for continuity of representation 
at one-to-one meetings, the turnover is much higher from the funds’ side, throwing 
back each new junior in attendance in lieu of the fund manager into ever greater 
reliance on theoretical knowledge. 
The structure of teaching on MBA programmes is heavily oriented towards 
issues of market efficiency, especially those that are consistent with the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (e.g., Thrift 1998: 164).  For the top programmes that utilize the case 
study teaching method, the cases are organized specifically to demonstrate to students 
the virtues of portfolio diversification.  When the juniors standing in for fund 
managers rely on theoretical knowledge in their dealings with corporate managers, it 
is these virtues which act as interpretive frameworks for what they are hearing. 
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(3) The influence of theoretical knowledge is by no means a one-way street.  
Corporate managers are reflexive actors.  If they learn from experience that their 
words will be interpreted through a theoretical lens prioritizing market efficiency, it is 
to be expected that they will adjust their presentational style to suit the most likely 
subsequent interpretation.  In this way, theoretical knowledge penetrates the 
representation of the firm, as corporate managers bow to their subordinate status in 
one-to-one meetings and allow themselves to be disciplined by their perceptions of 
fund managers’ expectations (e.g., Rao and Sivakumar 1999). 
The ensuing presentational style directly mirrors the dual focus which I 
suggest lies at the heart of the potentially contradictory microfoundations of 
financialization.  On the one hand, the meetings are conducted under the guise of 
assumptions concerning the merits of full portfolio diversification.  Yet, on the other 
hand, meaningful results can only ensue for the firm if corporate managers are able to 
persuade fund managers that they are exceptions to the rule.  The aim in this respect is 
to highlight ongoing attempts to restructure the firm’s business model in order to 
maximize shareholder value.  On the back of their extensive primary research of 
investor relations, Roberts et al. write (2006: 289-90) of a palpable sense of corporate 
managers trying to reinvent their management priorities so that they can give off the 
impression of being living embodiments of concerns for shareholder value.  However, 
this is clearly a juxtaposition of assuming market efficiency but believing that it is 
necessary to act contrary to the assumption. 
 
(4) Fund managers have one certain means of avoiding being caught out by such a 
juxtaposition: this is to use the market index as a benchmark to guide their actions.  
The use of some sort of benchmark is now widespread.  It reflects the incentives with 
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which fund managers are faced to match their own performance with that of their 
contemporaries.  Fund managers are subjected to routine scrutiny of their 
performance, where to retain their positions they must be able to show that they have 
done no worse than the performance of the average fund (e.g., Barber and Ghilarducci 
1993: 288).  That average in turn can be no higher than the average price change 
across the market as a whole.  Any fund manager whose portfolio directly replicates 
the properties of the market index is therefore guaranteed to pass the frequent 
performance checks which dominate the industry, no matter what other fund 
managers are doing. 
This helps to explain the growth of index-tracking funds since the 1980s.  
Such funds are a relatively easy sell to passive savers because they shun the 
concentration of high beta stocks.  Their rise has triggered the development of other 
types of fund, notably the hedge fund, in an attempt to use alternative trading 
strategies to escape what has been described by Davis’s respondents (2006: 12) as 
“the tyranny of the benchmarks”.  But the proliferation of index-tracking funds 
nonetheless serves to create conditions which appear to be entirely modelled on 
Sharpe’s hypothetical world. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Treating the issue purely theoretically, the microfoundations of financialization do 
indeed appear to be so tension-prone as to be outright contradictory.  I am content that 
the logic of the preceding argument is sound, but it is only in extremely rare instances 
that an absence of inherent sociality means that there is a direct correspondence 
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between immanent logic and actual practice.  In the real world, the stock trading 
system is grounded in embedded social relations to an extent which is impossible to 
capture in a theoretical treatment which assumes a performative relationship between 
finance theory and the financial economy. 
The identification of the contradictory microfoundations of financialization as 
outlined in the opening two sections relies on just such an assumption.  This does not 
make the analysis wrong, but it does caution against expecting to find the same clarity 
of relationship in empirical studies.  Sure enough, empirical treatments of the 
interaction between corporate managers and fund managers do indeed point to a much 
more socially rich working environment than is depicted in performativity theory.  
Yet, they do also point to important sources of evidence which are consistent with the 
implications of the purely theoretical discussion. 
The remaining questions to resolve are ones of degree: precisely how much 
confirmation of the theoretical relationships are we talking about here, and is that 
confirmation getting stronger or weaker over time?  Unfortunately, we are not yet in a 
position to know, and it is possible that we may never be.  The necessary information 
is hard to come by, and there are in any case extremely few researchers working 
actively on large-scale qualitative studies of fund manager practice.  It is also highly 
unlikely that such practice will remain as it was studied for long.  The ‘investment 
fund’ is not a homogeneous category, so any attempt at the sort of generalization 
entered into here necessarily comes at the risk of losing sight of existing diversity in 
funds’ trading strategies.  New types of fund which have not even been contemplated 
today are also likely to become a reality in the future.  The exact degree to which the 
theoretical relationships are actualized is unlikely to be stable over time: it will reflect 
the constant reinvention of the social relations of the stock trading system. 
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However, this should not be seen as invalidating the purpose of the foregoing 
enquiry.  There is much to be gained from analysing the potential contradictions of 
contemporary capitalism as a matter of logic, especially when partial confirmation is 
forthcoming for their practical manifestation.  Whatever the broader social influences 
on actual trading decisions, the common-sense properties of financial models create a 
very real dilemma of financialization for firms.  The successful operation of a 
financialized business model is entirely contingent upon fund managers ignoring the 
most fundamental insights of financial economics, but two significant contextual 
factors suggest that this will probably not be the case.  The reality of investing passive 
savers’ money means that fund managers are likely to internalize those savers’ risk-
aversion, which immediately places them in a decision-making context analogous to 
the hypothetical world of the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  The analogy is deepened 
when it is remembered that fund managers have to pass frequent performance checks 
which incentivize market-conforming trading strategies. 
As such, the fact that an increasing number of firms are submitting themselves 
to financialized management techniques most likely means that they will be running 
business models which do not work in their own terms.  There is much at stake, then, 
when it comes to discovering exactly how financial economics influences the 
investment decisions of fund managers.  By no means the least of the things at stake 
are the savings of individuals who increasingly have to rely on asset-based systems of 
welfare to fund their consumption in old age.  The long-term legitimation of 
financialization appears to depend, rather ironically, on fund managers activating the 
contradictions in financialized firms’ accumulation function. 
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1 This piece was written with the financial assistance of a grant from the UK’s Economic and Social 
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